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Privatization as a core government policy is not only well documented 
in economic and political literature, but has also been a key component 
of the transformation process in many countries, which have been changing 
their economic format from one that is centrally planned to one that is market 
oriented. Moreover, looking at the large number of developing countries during 
the last decades we can observe a massive retreat process of states from many 
areas previously regarded a priori as state-owned and state-regulated. 
Privatization, along with deregulations in many sectors, has been the first 
answer and the main antidote given by leading global financial institutions 
to developing economies experiencing budget, financial or economic 
difficulties (Urban 2015).
However, looking at the global picture as a whole, we can find evidence 
that over the 2001–2012 period governments acquired more assets through 
stock purchases than they sold through share issue privatizations and direct 
sales. The key factor that seems to explain these obvious contradictions 
is that the government purchases of equity have recently been conducted 
mostly by state entities acting as investors rather than owners. Much of this 
state investment was channeled through special investment vehicles – sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs), and the vast bulk of stock purchases have been cross 
border transactions (Bortolotti, Fotak, Megginson 2014).
Given the fact that according to Keynes international capital allocation 
is always politically motivated, questions arise to whether and to what extent this 
is true for Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), a sovereign wealth fund 
operating from Norway. The main goal of this chapter is to analyze investment 
policy of this state-controlled entity and provide the picture of its portfolio 
investment in Eastern and Central Europe Countries. For this purpose, 
the remainder of the chapter is organized in the following manner: in the next 
part facts and figures about the fund are presented, than the investment 
policy of the fund is described, after that the holdings of GPFG in Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia are analyzed, and finally the political implications of these investments 
are discussed with particular emphasis on the issue of risks. The chapter ends 
with conclusions.
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6.1. Government Pension Fund Global – facts 
and figures 
The rise and growth of the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund is strongly 
associated with the exploitation of petroleum resources in the North Sea. 
Petroleum was discovered there in 1969 and oil production started soon 
thereafter in 1971. Throughout an almost two decade-long period, a sizeable 
income from the exploitation of this resource had accumulated and in response 
thereto, Norway’s Parliament passed the Government Petroleum Fund 
Law. As a result, to support the long-term management of the petroleum 
revenues the Petroleum Fund was established and since its inception the fund 
has been a tool of fiscal policy. At the beginning the fund did not operate 
as an independent entity but constituted a department of the government 
apparatus, managed by the Norwegian Central Bank (Baker 2009, p. 132).
In 1996 the fund received the first capital transfer from the Ministry 
of Finance (NOK 46 billion), which was invested in the same way as foreign 
exchange reserves held by the Norwegian central bank. In the following year 
the decision was made to diversify the portfolio and invest 40% of the assets 
in equities instead of holding solely government bonds. In 1998, when the total 
value of the fund was NOK 172 billion, Norges Bank Investment Management 
was set up to manage the fund on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. Two 
years later, five emerging markets were added to the fund’s benchmark equity 
index; by that time the value of the fund was calculated to be NOK 386 billion. 
In 2002 the fund started investing in corporate and securitized bonds. In 2004 
with the fund’s value amounted to over NOK 1 billion, the ethical guidelines 
for the fund were established. The Government Petroleum Fund changed its 
name to Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) in 2006. In the next year 
the Ministry of Finance decided to increase the fund’s share of equity investment 
from 40% to 60% and also to add small-cap companies to the benchmark 
portfolio. In 2008 real estate was included in the fund’s investment universe, 
with a maximum share of 5% of total assets. By that year the total value 
of the fund was NOK 2.275 billion and the reference equity index of the fund 
included all emerging markets. In 2009 the fund’s share of equity in its asset 
portfolio reached 60% and the fund’s ethical guidelines were evaluated. By 2010 
a mandate to the investment policy of the fund was introduced to invest 
as much as 5% of the fund in real estate through a corresponding reduction 
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in the fixed-income holdings. In 2012 the Ministry of Finance announced 
a plan to gradually reduce the share of European holdings to 40% of the fund 
and increase its investments in emerging markets up to 10% (http://www.nbim.
no/en/the-fund/history/ [accessed: 3.09.2015]; Canner and Green 2010).
Nowadays, GPFG is the single largest sovereign wealth fund with USD 
882 billion worth of assets under management (http://www.swfinstitute.
org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/ [accessed: 3.09.2015]). At the end 
of 2014 GPFG’s portfolio consisted of 9124 equity investments, accounting 
for 62.3% of the portfolio 4,256 fixed-income investments (36.5%) and real 
investment accounting for 2.2% of the portfolio (http://www.nbim.no/en/
the-fund/holdings/ [accessed: 3.09.2015]). As regard to geographical location 
of the investments (see Figure 1) 39.9% take place in Europe, 38% in North 
America and 15.5% in Asia.
Figure 6.1. Government Pension Fund Global investments by region at the end of 2014 
Source: http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/holdings/ [accessed: 3.09.2015].
The fund’s annual return ranges from -23.32% to +25.62%, with a 5.9% 
annualized return since 1998, 6.12% in the last 10 years and 6.92% in the last 
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Global Quarterly Report 2015, p. 15). GPFG is a commodity-based sovereign 
wealth fund with a high level of transparency (10 points in the Linaburg-
Maduell Transparency Index – http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-
fund-rankings/ [accessed: 4.09.2015]).
Besides being the tool for the transfer of the country’s wealth for future 
generations, GPFG insulates the domestic economy from the resource curse, 
known as the “Dutch disease.” The experiences of other countries have 
shown that the sudden inflow of capital to the economy can rapidly inflate 
domestic prices and the exchange rate, decrease international competitiveness 
of the economy and result in de-industrialization (Chambers et al. 2012). Due 
to capital allocation on foreign markets via the use of the special investment 
vehicles that are SWFs, governments can improve resource allocation (Gieve 
2008, p. 199) and for economies having a surplus of foreign exchange inflow, 
investing through SWFs gives an opportunity to sterilize this capital, avoid 
price bubbles and high inflation (Heyward 2008, p. 21). Another economic 
benefit that GPFG offers is that it helps to reduce the opportunity cost 
of reserve holdings due to greater portfolio diversification of reserve-assets 
and reduce the volatility driven by changes in commodity export prices (IMF 
2008b, p. 4).
Holding over 1% of the total shares from different regional markets all 
around the world, GPFG is a leading example of a universal owner (Kiernan 
2007; Gjessing, Syse 2007). The universal owner hypothesis states that although 
a large, long-term investor with diverse investment holdings can initially 
benefit from a company externalizing cost, the investor might ultimately 
experience a reduction in overall return due to these externalities adversely 
affecting returns from other assets. Thus, universal owners have an incentive 
to reduce negative externalities created by companies from their portfolios, 
such as pollution emission, corruption and increase positive externalities such 
as sound corporate governance and good human capital practices across their 
investment portfolios (Hawley, Williams 2000). For universal owners, overall 
economic performance will have an influence on the future value of their 
holdings more than the performance of individual companies or sectors, 
suggesting that universal owners will support the goal of sustainable growth 
and well-functioning financial markets. Consequently, a universal owner will 
view its goals holistically and seek ways to reduce externalities that produce 
economy-wide efficiency losses (Urwin 2011, p. 26; Nagell 2011, p. 81).
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Summing up, GPFG is the largest SWF as well as important institutional 
investor in global financial markets. But is not the size of the fund that prompt 
the attentions; it is the investment policy of the fund. Generally speaking, 
the fund is allowed to invest in targeted companies only if they meet certain 
corporate governance, social and environmental criteria. Clark and Monk 
(2010) argue that GPFG has been at the forefront of ethical and socially 
responsible investment initiatives. As a result, the fund appears to have become 
an expression of Norwegian commitment to global justice.
6.2. The investment policy of the fund 
The investment policy of GPFG has been evolving along with the growth 
of assets under its management. In 2004 Ethical Guidelines of investment were 
adopted. The premises for the Ethical Guidelines were two ethical obligations 
pointed out by the Graver Committee and then discussed and debated 
by the Norwegian Parliament. The first of them was the obligation to ensure 
financial returns so that future generations will benefit from the oil wealth, 
contingent on sustainable development. The second was to respect fundamental 
rights for those who are affected by the companies in which GPFG invests 
(Halvorssen 2011, p. 3). Thus, on the one hand it seems to be an expression 
of the belief that besides intergenerational justice, a sovereign wealth fund 
should contribute to the implementation of universally accepted values 
and norms (Reiche 2010, p. 3570).
On the other hand, given the fact that “nothing is external to a global shareowner” 
(Monks 2001, p. 105) the acceptance of ethical restrictions on investment 
occurs as a natural consequence of the awareness that arises regarding the role 
of externalities in portfolio management. The large equity positions, usually held 
in the form of minor ownership stakes across hundreds and thousands of companies 
scattered across the globe means that portfolios of such universal investors 
are exposed to costs linked to negative externalities. For example, a portfolio holding 
causing excessive greenhouse gasses, overusing water and making unsustainable use 
of natural resources may affect the ability of another company held in the portfolio 
to operate profitably. Consequently, it undermines the long term risk adjusted return 
of the universal owner. Thus, ethical guidelines are the tool that socially responsible 
investors use to actively engage with corporations in order to minimize negative 
externalities (Létourneau 2013).
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GPFG’s asset holdings are mainly invested in accordance with a benchmark 
index determined by the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. This is a list that shows 
how much capital should initially be placed in each individual security the fund 
invests in. The benchmark index consists of 60% equities and 40% fixed income, 
however, gradually 5% of the assets will be invested in real estate. Norges Bank, 
delegated by the Ministry of Finance to manage the fund, is permitted to deviate 
slightly, within limits, from this list (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2010, p. 8).
As a responsible investor GFFG is meant to:
• promote good corporate governance and  greater awareness of  social 
and environmental issues among companies in which it has holdings;
• help companies in its portfolio to respect fundamental ethical norms;
• promote sustainable development in  an  economic, social 
and environmental sense;
• promote good corporate governance as well as organization of financial 
markets;
• preclude the Fund from having investments that conflict with Norway’s 
obligations under international law;
• avoid investments in companies that are engaged in grossly unethical 
activities (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2010, p. 14).
The responsibility for executing the investment policy of the fund is divided 
among The Ministry of Finance, Norges Bank and Council of Ethics. 
The first is responsible for establishing underlying principles for the exercise 
of ownership rights as well as for criteria regarding the exclusion of companies. 
It also makes the decision whether or not the company should be excluded. 
The second exercises the ownership rights in individual cases and also reports 
quarterly on active ownership activities. The last gives advice on the exclusion 
of companies from the fund’s holdings (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2010, 
p. 14).
The investment policy of GPFG states the active ownership to safeguard 
the fund’s financial values by contributing to good governance and by striving 
to achieve higher ethical, social and environmental standards in the companies. 
Norges Bank’s activity is concentrated in certain key areas of significance 
to the portfolio of the fund. One of them is equal treatment of shareholders, 
which is especially important since the fund is mostly a small shareholder 
in many of the companies. Norges Bank also promotes better regulations 
and better corporate governance for financial markets, providing regular 
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input of work on new regulations for the financial market of many countries 
as well as global principles for corporate governance. Another key area 
of the interest is the protection of children’s rights and given the fact 
that in many companies and markets there is high risk of child labor, Norges 
Bank promotes the governance structure and reporting system to address 
this issue. Since the portfolios of the Fund are exposed to the risk of adverse 
economic effects of climate change, companies from it are expected to have 
strategies for managing physical and economic effects of climate change. 
Additionally, it is to set clear targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
to explore opportunities to develop new products and services that will help 
the transition to a low-carbon economy. Another important component 
of the Fund’s investment policy is the exclusion of companies from the portfolio. 
Most of the instances of exclusion concern companies that produce certain 
products, such as key components for weapons that violate fundamental 
humanitarian principles through their normal use (nuclear weapons, cluster 
munitions, anti-personnel land mines). Individual companies may also be 
excluded from the Fund if it is determined that they run an unacceptable risk 
of contributing to grossly unethical activities (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
2010, p. 22–30).
Summing up, GPFG with globally diversified holdings, is a leading example 
of an institutional investor with social, governance and environmental 
components deeply tied with the core values of the investment policy. GPFG’s 
activities prove the possibility of combining ethical values with financial 
expectations regarding the rate of return. At the same time, the Fund 
is a political tool of the state, used to promote the globally underlying values 
of the Norwegian people. The stream of capital provided to companies as well 
as to other governments via the purchase of bonds is conditioned by political 
factors. Such restrictions on investment are communicated directly, leaving no 
room for suspicions or suppositions.
6.3. GPFG holdings in Central and Eastern Europe 
A lack of data along with low transparency make it almost impossible 
to perform an investment analysis of most SWFs. Against this background 
GPFG is a prominent exception; the Fund provides comprehensive 
information about it activities, allowing researchers to evaluate the objectives 
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and performance of the fund. Despite of that empirical research concerning 
GPFG investment activity in Eastern and Central Europe Countries is very 
limited in numbers and provides more of a country rather than regional picture 
of the issue. Due to that fact an analysis of the GPFG’s investment activities 
in these markets is needed.
Table 6.1. Holdings of GPFG in selected Eastern and Central Europe Countries 
at the end of 2014 (USD)
Country Equities Fixed-income Total
Bulgaria – 125,293,517 125,293,517
Czech Republic 83,730,658 957,119,917 1,040,850,575
Estonia – 14,688,058 14,688,058
Hungary 117,137,959 399,014,626 516,152,585
Latvia – 33,524,729 33,524,729
Lithuania 2,690,878 94,782,942 97,473,820
Poland 1,163,857,654 2,799,211,006 3,963,068,660
Romania 128,717,213 – 128,717,213
Slovakia – 261,870,110 261,870,110
Source: http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/holdings/ [accessed: 4.09.2015].
At the end of 2014, GPFG had holdings in the following countries 
from the Central and Europe region: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia. The portfolio of assets 
in these countries consists of two categories: equities and fixed-income assets. 
Table 6.1 presents the basic information regarding the Fund’s holdings in this 
region.
The data suggests that the highest capital allocation from GPFG is taking 
place in Poland, followed by the Czech Republic and Hungary. At the end 
of that list there are the Baltic states. In all countries the Fund has investments 
in fixed-income assets, excluding Romania. The Fund had not invested 
in equities in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia. However, due 
to the difference in size of the country, a comparison between economies based 
on this data does not provide the full picture of the issue. Figure 6.2 presents 




Figure 6.2. Capital allocations of GPFG scaled to country’s GDP at the end of 2014 (USD) 
Explanation: values on the Y axis are a ratio of capital allocation from the Fund to a country’s GDP. 
Source: own calculations based on the data from Fund’s webpage http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/
holdings/ [accessed: 4.09.2015] and World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator [accessed: 
4.09.2015].
Given the size of the economy measured by country’s GDP, a conclusion can be 
drawn that the Norwegian SWF had invested the most in Poland, with Slovakia 
taking second place and Czech Republic third. What is worth mentioning 
is that a relatively low capital inflow from GPFG has been directed to Romania.
As regard portfolio investment, the issue of diversifications versus home 
bias is often the subject of analysis. According to the portfolio theory, a rational 
investor should allocate its capital taking into account the share of particular 
assets in the overall market as well as the share of that market globally. Several 
authors argue that the behavior of investors is in contradiction with these 
assumptions. The home-bias hypothesis states that due to the cost of information, 
similarities in terms of religion, geographical location, etc., investors increase 
the share of some assets from one market while decreasing the share of the assets 
from another in their overall portfolio. In order to validate the home-bias 
preferences of GPFG, using GDP we compared the share of the single economies 
in the overall GDP of 8 countries with a similar share of capital allocation. 
The results are presented in Figure 6.3. Two things seem to be clear, Poland 
is the market flooded by the fund while Romania garners the least interest, given 
the total portfolio of assets held by GPFG in this group of countries. However, 
taking the market capitalization of listed companies as a benchmark (Figure 
6.4), for these two countries an opposite conclusion can be drawn. In the case 
of other countries the picture seems to be relatively clear, the capital allocation 
from the fund is consistent with the share of the country within the group, 
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Figure 6.3. Share of a country’s GDP versus share of capital allocation from GPFG 
Source: own calculations based on the data from GPDG’s webpage http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/
holdings/ [accessed: 4.09.2015] and World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator [accessed: 4.09.2015].
Figure 6.4. Share of market capitalization of listed companies versus share of capital allocation from GPFG 
Source: own calculations based on the data from GPFG’s webpage http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/
holdings/ [accessed: 4.09.2015] and World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator [accessed: 4.09.2015].
GPFG’s investments in Central and Eastern Europe differ not only in terms 
of the total value of capital allocated in each economy, but also in terms 
of the number of portfolio holdings. The fund has 92 equity holdings in Poland, 
9 in Romania as well as in Hungary, 4 in the Czech Republic and 1 in Lithuania. 
The fixed-income investments of the fund consist of national government 
bond holdings, with the exception of the Czech Republic where there are also 3 
holdings in government related companies.
Given the fact that the majority of equity investments in Central and Eastern 
Europe is allocated in Poland, previous studies have focused on analyzing 
investment behavior of the Fund in this particular country. Urban (2015) 
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employed the logit model to analyze the investment attractiveness of companies 
for the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund. The empirical findings of this 
research suggest that the likelihood of GPFG investment in a company listed 
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange is associated with a statistically significant 
level of total operating revenue, total assets, earnings per share, enterprise 
value and market capitalization of the firm. These results are to some extent 
similar to those obtained by Kotter and Lel (2011) suggesting that GPFG prefers 
investing in large companies. The findings of this study also suggest that not only 
the growth of earnings per share increases the probability of such investments, 
but also a company with GPFG as an investor has on average a higher level 
of earnings per share than companies not targeted for investment by GPFG. 
As to further research issue the author suggests to search for other motives 
for investment than financial ones, which is justified because of the relatively 
low predictive power of the models.
In another study Urban (2015) examined the impact of SWF ownership 
on the financial performance of firms. Empirical findings of this research 
based on regression models and financial data of Polish companies listed 
on the Warsaw Stock Exchange and targeted by the GPFG suggest that SWF 
ownership has a positive impact on the price to book value of the firm. In case 
of ROA and ROE as left hand variables the coefficients of GPFG’s variable 
is not statistically significant, however positive. The author points out the need 
for conducting a comparative study for industry specific issues based on a larger 
data set and use of panel data.
The current holdings of GPFG on the Warsaw Stock Exchange by industry 
are presented in Figure 6.5. It suggests that listed companies from the financial 
sector have the highest share in the overall portfolio holdings of the Fund 
(38.9%), with industrials taking second place (15.7%) and basic materials 
third (12.22%). The share of oil & gas companies in the portfolio is 9.38%, 
consumer goods and consumer services 7.18% and 6.78% respectively. 
For the remaining industries it is less than 5%. In the case of equity 
holdings in Romania, 42.99% are listed companies from the financial sector, 
32.45% from the oil & gas industry and 24.55% from utilities. The Fund’s 
portfolio in Hungary is overwhelmed by companies from the financial 
sector with a share of over 90%. GPFG has also shares of 3 listed companies 
from the Czech Republic (utility, financial, telecommunications) and 1 
from Lithuania (industrials).
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Figure 6.5. Holdings of GPFG on the Warsaw Stock Exchange by industry at the end of 2014 
Source: own calculations based on the data from GPFG’s webpage http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/
holdings/ [accessed: 4.09.2015].
As for as  the average ownership in companies from the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange is concerned, it ranges from 0.13% in utilities, 0.92% 
in telecommunications, through to 1.81% in financials and 2.15% in consumer 
services, and finally 3.18% in industrials and 3.60% in health care. The average 
ownership in the Polish companies is 2.15%, on the Hungarian stock market 
it is 0.96% and in Romania 1.23%.
The investment activity of the GPFG in Eastern and Central European 
is dominated by holdings in just one market – Poland. This concentration seems 
to be justified by the size of the economy and the capacity of the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange. However, to fully understand the investment preferences of the fund 
in this region, the global holdings of GPFG should be analyzed, which, given 
the size of the portfolio, seems to be a task for further research. In this context 
comparative analysis of GPFG’s portfolio holdings from different emerging 
markets would be an interesting avenue for future research. Further studies 
should also focus on other than only financial characteristics of firms and take 
into account environmental, social and governance factors that could possibly 
determine the capital allocation of the largest SWF and socially responsible 
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6.4. Political implications of GPFG’s capital 
allocation 
SWFs, as it was pointed out earlier in this book, are a heterogeneous group 
of investors, with different objectives, changing over the time. The hybrid nature 
of these entities implies not only methodological difficulties in defining which 
state run fund is and which is not a SWF, but also makes it difficult or even 
impossible to draw conclusions that can be generalized to the entire group. 
Moreover, the lack of transparency about strategic asset allocation and the absence 
of a robust model describing it hinders in many cases the analysis on whether 
SWFs pursue political goals, rather than purely financial objectives (Bertoni, 
Lugo 2012). Against the majority of funds, GPFG is a unique case. The high 
transparency of its activities allow one to verify a hypothesis about financial as well 
as political motives of its investments. In this sub-chapter we address the issue 
of risk or concerns related to the activity of the Norwegian state-run fund.
Looking at the list of potential treats, bearing in mind the characteristics 
of GPFG, it is difficult to clearly point out a particular one. As regard 
to the pursuit of political and economic power objectives via SWFs, it seems 
to be very limited, probably due to the relatively low purely economic as well 
as political influence of Norway on other countries from the region and globally. 
SWFs can be use to support or complement other tools of political influence 
rather than replace them. Future studies should analyze the relationship 
between economic and political power of the SWF’s host country and the level 
of political engagement of the funds. Given the fact that GPDF investments 
are fully transparent and there is no sign of concentration in sensitive industries 
of the countries, it is unlikely that the activity of this fund will stimulate financial 
protectionism in countries from the region. Contrary, promoting better 
regulations and corporate governance for financial markets along with providing 
regular input of work on new regulations for the financial market of many 
countries as well as globally, which the fund does, in the author’s opinion affects 
markets in the opposite direction. However, GPFG can have a negative impact 
on the selected group of companies from the region. The political decision 
of the Norwegian Parliament to stop investing in coal-industry companies 
and withdraw the money previously invested in this sector, might affect the value 
of the shares and valuation of the companies. Due to the fact that the Norwegian 
fund has relatively low stakes in companies listed on stock exchanges, such 
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a threat is rather limited. On the other side it is likely that in the future Norway 
will use its capital transferred to the economy as a bargaining chip to encourage 
a particular country to reduce its CO2 emissions. Finally, addressing the issue 
of a conflict of interests between countries with SWFs and countries in which 
they invest, it is worth reminding that ethical guidelines for investment preclude 
capital allocation that conflict Norway’s obligation under international as well 
as a given state’s law. As a consequence of that, such risk is relatively low.
To sum up, the abovementioned analysis does not support the hypothesis 
that the investment activity of GPFG poses a significant and real threat 
to targeted companies or countries, however, it seem to be clear that the Fund has 
been used as a political tool. In the case of countries from Eastern and Central 
Europe, political use of the fund is rather limited, most likely due to the fact 
that this group of countries share the same canon of values, rules and principles 
as Norway does.
Conclusions 
With USD 882 billion of assets under its management and 2.4% of holdings 
of total shares of companies in Europe, the Norwegian Government Pension 
Fund Global proves to be an important institutional investor with possible 
implications for asset prices. The latest decision of the fund to reduce its holdings 
in companies engaged in coal mining along with low prices of natural resources 
might have an influence on company valuations, located not only in Central 
and Eastern Europe. At the same time this political decision sends a clear 
signal to the public opinion that deeper and faster action needs to be taken 
to address the issue of global warming and climate change. Large institutional 
investors often have sufficient financial as well as political power to become 
drivers of change; GPFG’s investment activity is clear evidence of that. Along 
with others institutional investors, GPFG can use capital allocation as a tool 
of political pressure, depending on the economies and companies it allocates 
capital to. However, without obligations regarding climate change on the global 
level, the influence of the Fund in this issue is rather limited.
Good corporate governance practices, sensitivity regarding human, social 
and environmental issues, and the ability to promote the canon of values 
professed by the Norwegian society are the key characteristics of GPFG, 
and have been the subject of analysis in this chapter. The growing capital 
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engagement and high transparency standards give premise for further empirical 
studies not only about the impact of investments on financial performance 
of targeted companies but also on the political aspects of capital allocation.
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